Prompt Injection
İstem enjeksiyonu
D5 · Security, privacy, governance and intellectual property
Prompt injection is an attack in which untrusted content supplies instructions that conflict with or redirect an LLM-integrated system’s intended instructions or data handling.
Review status: 2026-11-26
Technical explanation
It can be direct through a user’s input or indirect through content that a system retrieves, reads, or processes, and can affect connected tools or data flows.
Conceptual boundaries
Prompt injection is not ordinary prompt engineering, a hallucination, or a problem solved by a stronger system prompt alone.
Provider-neutral example
A web page hides “ignore previous instructions” in text read by an assistant.
Limitations
Mitigations can reduce impact, but current guidance does not establish a fool-proof prevention method for every LLM-integrated system.
Related concepts
Atomic claims and evidence
1.1NIST AI 100-2e2025, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations — D5 security slice
- Source
- NIST AI 100-2e2025, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations — D5 security slice
- Source role
- Authoritative source
- Exact locator
- Sections 3.2-3.4, printed pp. 40-53
- Supported claim
- NIST describes direct and indirect prompt injection, including indirect attacks that can substitute malicious instructions for a model’s system prompt through processed external content.
- Last verification
- Review due
- Scope limitation
- This taxonomy describes attack forms; it does not imply that every external document contains an attack.
1.2MITRE ATLAS, Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application
- Source
- MITRE ATLAS, Prompt Infiltration via Public-Facing Application
- Source role
- Authoritative source
- Exact locator
- Definition
- Supported claim
- NIST describes direct and indirect prompt injection, including indirect attacks that can substitute malicious instructions for a model’s system prompt through processed external content.
- Last verification
- Review due
- Scope limitation
- This taxonomy describes attack forms; it does not imply that every external document contains an attack.
2.1OWASP LLM Prompt Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Source
- OWASP LLM Prompt Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet
- Source role
- Supplementary source
- Exact locator
- Primary Defenses; Additional Defenses; Best Practices Checklist
- Supported claim
- OWASP identifies input validation, structured separation of instructions and data, output validation, least privilege, monitoring, and human controls as defenses, while noting that defenses mitigate rather than guarantee prevention.
- Last verification
- Review due
- Scope limitation
- The listed defenses are context-dependent controls, not proof that a stronger system prompt alone solves prompt injection.
2.2MITRE CWE-1427, Improper Neutralization of Input Used for LLM Prompting
- Source
- MITRE CWE-1427, Improper Neutralization of Input Used for LLM Prompting
- Source role
- Authoritative source
- Exact locator
- Potential Mitigations; Modes Of Introduction
- Supported claim
- OWASP identifies input validation, structured separation of instructions and data, output validation, least privilege, monitoring, and human controls as defenses, while noting that defenses mitigate rather than guarantee prevention.
- Last verification
- Review due
- Scope limitation
- The listed defenses are context-dependent controls, not proof that a stronger system prompt alone solves prompt injection.
2.3NIST AI 100-2e2025, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations — D5 security slice
- Source
- NIST AI 100-2e2025, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations — D5 security slice
- Source role
- Authoritative source
- Exact locator
- Sections 3.3.3 and 3.4.4, printed pp. 47-49 and 53
- Supported claim
- OWASP identifies input validation, structured separation of instructions and data, output validation, least privilege, monitoring, and human controls as defenses, while noting that defenses mitigate rather than guarantee prevention.
- Last verification
- Review due
- Scope limitation
- The listed defenses are context-dependent controls, not proof that a stronger system prompt alone solves prompt injection.